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Abstract. Persons with an Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) may show certain 
types of deviations in social functioning. Since the discovery of mirror neuron 
systems and their role in social functioning, it has been suggested that ASD-
related behaviours may be caused by certain types of malfunctioning of mirror 
neuron systems. This paper presents an approach to explore such possible 
relationships more systematically. As a basis it takes an agent model 
incorporating a mirror neuron system. This is used for functional computational 
analysis of the different types of malfunctioning of a mirror neuron system that 
can be distinguished, and to which types of deviations in social functioning 
these types of malfunctioning can be related. 
Keywords: agent model, analysis, mirror neuron systems, autism spectrum 
disorder. 
1   Introduction 
Autism is a developmental disorder showing a wide range of (gradual) differences in 
functioning across patient populations. The major features that characterize autistic 
persons are deficits in social interaction, but also abnormalities in language within a 
social context and repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behavior are seen. Some 
characteristics can be observed in all autistic persons, but it is very rare that in one 
person all kinds of autism-related behavior are found. Different persons with some 
form of autism may feature different ranges of behaviors. Therefore nowadays the 
term Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is used rather than autism. There seem to be 
no strict boundaries in the spectrum of autism. It is assumed that ASD may be caused 
by a number of neurological factors responsible for the specific type of ASD-related 
behaviours shown by a person. Since the discovery of mirror neuron systems and their 
role in social functioning, it has been assumed that in some way ASD relates to 
malfunctioning of the person’s mirror neuron system; e.g. [16], [20]. Given the wide 
variety of deviant behaviours observed in different persons with ASD, a natural step 
then is to analyse functionally what types of malfunctioning of a mirror neuron 
system can be distinguished, and to explore how each of these types of 
malfunctioning relates to which types of deviant behaviours. To describe an agent-
based model for such a computational analysis is the main focus of the current paper.  
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A large amount of publications is available describing the behavior of persons with 
ASD; e.g., [10], [16], [19], [20]. There is no unique physical appearance that shows 
that someone has ASD. It is seen in persons of all ages and in different ranges within 
a broad spectrum; it is universal and timeless. The major characteristics concern 
deficits in social interaction. Also difficulties and a shortage in language acquisition, 
the tendency towards repetition of actions and narrowed focus may occur. In most 
cases, persons with ASD are not mentally disabled. Examples of possible 
characteristics found are reduced forms of self-other differentiation, empathy, 
imitation, eye contact, facial expression, gestures, shared intention and attention, or 
strong concentration on or occupation with a subject. Pioneers in research in autistic 
phenomena were Leo Kanner [17] and Hans Asperger [1]. They both came up with 
detailed case studies and made an attempt to give an explanation. The term ‘autistic’ 
was originally used by the psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler, to describe a particular case of 
schizophrenia, which narrows the view of the patient in an immense way; see also [3]. 
The main difference between the papers is that Asperger’s descriptions and 
definitions of the disorder are broader than Kanner’s view on it. 
The presented approach is based on the assumption that to obtain a solid basis for a 
computational analysis: (1) an agent model incorporating the functionality of mirror 
neuron systems is designed, allowing modifications to model certain types of 
malfunctioning, and (2)  this agent model is formally specified in an executable form 
to obtain the possibility to exploit computational formal analysis as a means to 
explore which behaviours may result from such an agent model and modified variants 
to model types of malfunctioning of the agent’s  mirroring system. With this agent 
model incorporating a mirror neuron system as a basis (presented in Section 2). In 
Section 3 different modifications of the agent model to model different types of 
malfunctioning are explored, and it is analysed which types of deviant social 
behaviour emerge from these types of malfunctioning. Section 4 is a discussion. 
2   An Agent Model with a Mirror Neuron System as a Basis 
Within a person’s neurological processes, sensory representations of stimuli usually 
lead to preparations for responses. Recent neurological findings more and more reveal 
that socalled ‘preparation’ or premotor neurons have multiple functions; preparing for 
an action that actually is to be executed is only one of these functions. Sometimes, an 
action is prepared, but execution of the action is not taking place. For example, 
preparation of actions may play a role in interpreting an observation of somebody else 
performing an action, by internally simulating that action, or in imagining the action 
and its consequences; e.g., [15], [14], [16]. In these cases, actual execution of the 
prepared action is prevented. Without altering any body state, activation of 
preparation states can lead to further mental processing via an as-if body loop [7], [8] 
from preparation state to emotions felt by sensory representation of body states 
associated to the (expected) outcome of the prepared action. For the agent model, the 
following internal causal chain for a stimulus s is assumed; see [7], [8]: 
Sensory representation of s → preparation for response → sensory representation of body state   
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This causal chain is extended to a recursive loop by assuming that the preparation for 
the response is also affected by the level of feeling the emotion associated to the 
expected outcome of the response:  
sensory representation of body state  →  preparation for response   
Thus the obtained agent model is based on reciprocal causation relations between 
emotions felt and preparations for responses. Within the agent model presented here, 
states are assigned a quantitative (activation) level or gradation. The positive feedback 
loops between preparation states for responses and their associated body states, and 
the sensory representations of expected outcomes are triggered by a sensory 
representation of a stimulus and converge to a certain level of feeling and preparation.  
Apparently, activation of preparation neurons by itself has no unambiguous 
meaning; it is strongly context-dependent. Suitable forms of context can be 
represented at the neurological level based on what are called supermirror neurons 
[14, pp. 196-203], [18]; see also [5]. These are neurons which were found to have a 
function in control (allowing or suppressing) action execution after preparation has 
taken place. In single cell recording experiments with epileptic patients [18], cells 
were found that are active when the person prepares an own action to be executed, but 
shut down when the action is only observed, suggesting that these cells may be 
involved in the distinction between a preparation state to be used for execution, and a 
preparation state generated to interpret an observed action. In [14, pp. 201-202] it is 
also described that as part of this context representation, certain cells are sensitive to a 
specific person, so that in the case of an observed action, this action can be attributed 
to the person that was observed. Within the agent  model presented in this section, the 
functions of super mirror neurons have been incorporated as focus states, generated 
by processing of available (sensory) context information. For the case modeled, this 
focus can refer to the person her or himself, or to an observed person.  
To formalise the agent model in an executable manner, the hybrid dynamic 
modeling language LEADSTO has been used; cf. [4]. Within LEADSTO the dynamic 
property or temporal relation a → D b denotes that when a state property a occurs, then 
after a certain time delay (which for each relation instance can be specified as any 
positive real number D), state property b will occur. Below, this D will be taken as the 
time step Δt, and usually not be mentioned explicitly. Both logical and quantitative 
calculations can be specified, and a software environment is available to support 
specification and simulation. The modeled agent receives input from the external 
world, for example, another agent is sensed (see also Fig. 1). Not all signals from the 
external world come in with the same level, modelled by having a sensor state of 
certain strength. The sensor states, in their turn, will lead to sensory representations. 
Sensory representations lead to a state called supermirroring state and to a specific 
motor preparation state. The supermirroring state provides a focus state for regulation 
and control, it also supports self-other distinction. In the scenario used as illustration, 
it is decisive in whether a prepared action is actually executed by the observing agent, 
or a communication to the observed agent is performed reflecting that it is understood 
what the other agent is feeling. Note that the internal process modelled is not a linear 
chain of events, but cyclic: the preparation state of the agent is updated constantly in a 
cyclic process involving both a body loop and an internal as-if body loop (via the 
connections labeled with w6 and w7). All updates of states take place in parallel. 
Computational Analysis of Mirroring Dysfunctioning in Autism Spectrum Disorders  309 
 
Capitals in the agent model are variables (universally quantified), lower case letters 
specific instantiations. All strengths are represented by values between 0 and 1. A 
capital V with or without subscripts indicates a real number between 0 and 1. The 
variable S reflects that it is of the sort signal and B of the sort that concerns the 
agent’s body state. What is outside the dotted lining is not a part of the internal 
process of the agent. The first two sensor states (sensor_state(A,V) and sensor_state(S,V)) 
are possibly coming from a single source in the external source, but are not further 
specified: their specific forms are not relevant for the processes captured in this agent 
model. A more detailed description will follow below. For each of the dynamic 
properties an informal and formal explanation is given.  
 ?
sensor_state(S, V) srs(S, V) effector_state(B, V)
body_state(B,V)
sensor_state(B, V) srs(B, V)
sensor_state(A, V) srs(A, V)
supermirroring(A, S, V)
prep_state(B, V)
prep_comm(A, B, V) comm(I know how you feel,A, B)
w5
w4
w3
w2
w1
w9
w8w6
w7
w10
 
Fig. 1. Overview of the agent model 
Dynamic Property 1  Generating a sensory representation for another agent  
If  the presence of another agent A is sensed with a certain strength V,  
then a sensory representation of A will occur with level V. 
sensor_state(A,V) →  srs(A,V) 
Dynamic Property 2  Generating a sensory representation for a property of the world 
If   a sensor state for S is present with a certain strength V, 
then a sensory representation of S will occur with strength V. 
sensor_state(S,V) →  srs(S,V) 
Super mirroring controls whether an action is to be performed (self-other distinction). 
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Dynamic Property 3  Super mirroring 
If   a sensory representation of another agent A occurs with a certain strength V1, 
   and a sensory representation of any world state property S occurs with certain strength V2, 
then supermirroring for A and S will take place, with strength f(w1V1, ow2V2). 
srs(A,V1) & srs(S,V) →  supermirroring(A, S, f(w1V1, ow2V2)) 
If   a sensory representation of state property instance s occurs with certain strength V, 
then supermirroring for self will take place, with strength V. 
srs(s,V) →  supermirroring(self, s, sw2V) 
Here w1 and ow2 are the strengths of the connections from, respectively, the sensory 
representation of the other agent and the sensory representation of the observed action 
(stimulus) to the super mirroring state, and sw2 the strength of the connection from the 
sensory representation of the stimulus to the super mirroring state for the case of self. 
These weights are in the normal situation set to value 1. By altering these 
connections, different output may show in the simulations. This is interesting when 
validating theories about dysfunctioning in some point of the process in persons with 
ASD. The function f(w1V1, ow2V2) is a combination function, mapping values from the 
interval [0, 1] onto values in the same interval. It can be calculated, for example, as 
f(w1V1, ow2V2) = w1V1+ ow2V2 - w1V1 ow2V2, or by a logistic threshold function f(w1V1, 
ow2V2) = 1/(1+ e-σ( w1V1 + ow2V2 - τ)), with σ a steepness and τ a threshold value. 
Dynamic Property 4  Preparing for motor execution 
If  sensory representation occurs of s1 (movement/action) in the world with level V1, 
   and   the preparation for body state b1 has level V2  
then the preparation state for body state b1 will have level f(V1, w3V2). 
srs(b1,V1)  &  srs(s1,V2) →  prep_state(b1, f(V1, w3V2)) 
Not every signal S that comes from the external world and which has generated a 
sensory representation will have a match in the sense that the body of the agent will 
prepare for an action. This specificity is seen in the rule, because signal s1 will 
generate body state b1, whereas any signal s2 will not generate b1, but maybe some b2. 
These are no universal quantified variables, which are written with capital letters in 
this description. As earlier, also here a connection strength is given. The weight w3 is 
the relation between the sensory representation of s1 and the preparation state for b1. 
Note that when a representation is not present, the value 0 is attributed to it.  
 
Dynamic Property 5  Generating an updated sensory representation  
If  the preparation state for body state B has level V1 
and  the sensor state for body state B has level V2 
then a sensory representation for body state B will be generated with level f(V1,V2). 
prep_state(B, V1) & sensor_state(B, V2) →  srs(B, f(V1,V2)) 
The state of the body and the preparation states are important in order to obtain a 
feeling; cf. Damasio (1999). The changes in the body will change the somatosensory 
system. In this way the altered body state produces the feeling. The earlier mentioned 
body loop (from preparation via execution to altered body state, and via sensing thia 
body state to sensory representation) and as if body loop (direct connection from 
preparation to sensory representation) are combined in this part of the agent model. 
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Dynamic Property 6  Generating action execution 
If  supermirroring for self and s occurs with certain strength V1. 
and  preparation of motor execution of body state b1 occurs with strength V2  
then motor execution of body state b1 will take place with level f(w4V1, w5V2). 
supermirroring(self, s, V1)  &  prep_state(b1, V2) →  effector_state(b1, f(w4V1, w5V2)) 
The value for the effector state is based on connection strengths from super mirroring 
to effector state (w4) and from preparation state to effector state (w5).  
 
Dynamic Property 7  From effector state to body state 
If  the effector state for body state B occurs with level V, 
then body state B will have level V. 
effector_state(B, V) →  body_state(B, V) 
When the agent performs an action, this generates a new body state of the agent.  
 
Dynamic Property 8  Generating a sensor state for a body state 
If  a body state B is sensed with strength V, 
then a sensor state body state B with the same level V will be generated. 
body_state(B, V) →  sensor_state(B, V) 
Dynamic Property 9  Generating a preparation for communication 
If  there is a sensory representation of body state B with level V1, 
   and supermirroring indicating world state S and agent A occurs with level V2, 
then preparation of communication to A about B will occur.with level f(w6V1, w7V2)  
srs(B, V1)  &  supermirroring(A, S, V2) →  prep_communication(A, B, f(w6V1, w7V2)) 
Also here, weights are used for connections between srs(B,V) and prep_communication(B, 
V) (w6) and between supermirroring(S, V) and prep_communication(B, V) (w7).  
 
Dynamic Property 10  Communication  
If  the preparation of a communication to A about B occurs with value V. 
then the agent will communicate ‘I know how you feel B’, to A with V as value. 
prep_communication(A, B, V) →  communication(A, I know how you feel, B, V) 
The communication that the agent knows what an observed agent feels is based upon 
feeling the same body state. After the observer gained the representation of the same 
body state, this can generate the feeling associated with it, and this is communicated.  
3   Functional Analysis and Simulation Based on the Agent Model 
To test the feasibility of the approach, the agent model described above was used as a 
basis for a functional analysis, also involving a number of simulations. The 
connection strengths w1, sw2, ow2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8, w9 and w10 which are 
parameters in the agent model, were systematically varied over the interval [0, 1], to 
inspect what the effects on the agent’s functioning are. In the simulations, the state 
properties progress over time. Every delay in a temporal property corresponds to one 
time point in a simulation run. An example trace for normal functioning is shown in 
Fig. 2. The dark lines in the upper part of this picture indicate the time intervals for  
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Fig. 2. Example simulation trace for normal functioning 
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which the indicated state properties hold. Extreme cases are when some of the 
connection strengths are 0. Three of such types of malfunctioning are discussed. 
 
Impaired basic mirroring. For example, when both w3 and w7 are 0, from the agent 
model it can easily be deduced that the preparation state will never have a nonzero 
level. This indeed is confirmed in simulations (in this case the second graph in the 
lower part of Fig. 2 is just a flat line at level 0). This illustrates a situation of full lack 
of basic mirroring of an observed action or body state. Due to this type of 
malfunctioning no imitation is possible, nor empathic attribution to another agent. 
 
 
Impaired supermirroring: self-other distinction, control. As another extreme case, 
when both w1 and ow2 are 0, from the agent model it can be deduced that the super 
mirroring state for an observed action from another agent will never have a nonzero 
level (in this case the first graph in the lower part of Fig. 2 is just a flat line at level 0). 
Therefore, never a communication will be prepared, independent of the level of 
preparation for a body state. This covers cases in which basic mirroring is fully 
functional, but self-other distinction as represented in supermirroring is fully absent, 
and therefore the mirrored action or body state cannot be attributed to the other agent, 
although they still can be imitated. This is also shown in simulations. 
 
Impaired emotion integration. Yet another extreme case occurs when w6 and w7 are 
0, in which case the emotion felt has no integration with the preparation for the action 
or body state. This covers persons who do not fully affect preparations by emotions 
felt. Here imitation still may be possible, and even attribution to another agent, but in 
general will be weaker, also depending on other connections (in this case some of the 
graphs in the lower part of Fig. 2 have a lower but nonzero level). 
 
Further systematic exploration has been performed in the sense that one connection 
at a time was changed, from very low (0.01 and 0.001), and low (0.25), to medium 
(0.5), and high (0.75) strengths. The connections w4, w5, w7 and w10 showed more 
substantial deviations from the normal situation in comparison to the connections w1, 
w2, w3, w6, w8 and w9. As an example, a reduced connection w5 (e.g., value 0.001) 
from preparation to body state
 
makes that it
 
takes longer to reach an increased value 
for the body state. This corresponds to persons with low expressivity of prepared 
body states. However, when the other connections are fully functional, still empathy 
may occur, and even be expressed verbally. 
4   Discussion 
The presented approach to explore possible relationships between types of 
malfunctioning of a mirror neuron system and deviations in social behaviour 
occurring in persons with ASD is based on an executable agent model. Alterations in 
parameter values of this agent model are used to analyse from a functional perspective 
which types of malfunctioning of a mirror neuron system can be distinguished, and to 
which types of deviations in social functioning these types of malfunctioning lead. 
This approach requires a number of steps. First the normal process must be 
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understood; for this inspiration was taken from the agent model described in [14]. In 
the case of autism spectrum disorder and the dysfunction of mirror neurons, there was 
no general description of the process in the sense of formalised causal relations. 
However, neurological evidence informally described what brain area would have an 
effect on the performance of certain tasks, resulting in (impaired) behavior. Modeling 
such causal relations as presented here does not take specific neurons into 
consideration but more abstract states, involving, for example, groups of neurons. At 
such an abstract level the proposed agent model summarizes the process in 
accordance with literature.  
The agent model allows to distinguish three major types of malfunctioning, 
corresponding to impaired mirroring, impaired self-other distinction and control 
(supermirroring), and impaired emotion integration. Neurological evidence for 
impaired mirroring in persons with ASD is reported, for example, in [9], [16], [21].  
This type of analysis fits well to the first case of malfunctioning discussed in Section 
4. In [16] the role of super mirror neurons is also discussed, but not in relation to 
persons with ASD. In [5], [13] it is debated whether the social deviations seen in ASD 
could be related more to impaired self-other distinction and control (impaired super 
mirroring) than to the basic mirror neuron system; for example: 
  
‘Recent research has focused on the integrity of the mirror system in autistic patients 
and has related this to poor social abilities and deficits in imitative performance in 
ASD [21]. To date this account is still being debated. In contrast to this hypothesis, we 
would predict that autistic patients likely to have problems in the control of imitative 
behaviour rather then in imitation per se. Recent evidence has revealed no deficit in 
goal-directed imitation in autistic children, which speaks against a global failure in the 
mirror neuron system in ASD [13]. It is, therefore, possible that the mirror system is 
not deficient in ASD but that this system is not influenced by regions that distinguish 
between the self and other agents.’ [4, p. 62] 
The type of impaired mechanism suggested here fits well to the second case of 
malfunctioning discussed in Section 4.  
In [11], [12] it is also debated whether the basic mirror neuron system is the source 
of the problem. Another explanation of ASD-related phenomena is suggested: 
impaired emotion integration: 
‘Three recent studies have shown, however, that, in high-functioning individuals with 
autism, the system matching observed actions onto representations of one’s own action 
is intact in the presence of persistent difficulties in higher-level processing of social 
information (…). This raises doubts about the hypothesis that the motor contagion 
phenomenon – “mirror” system – plays a crucial role in the development of 
sociocognitive abilities. One possibility is that this mirror mechanism, while 
functional, may be dissociated from socio-affective capabilities. (…) A dissociation 
between these two mechanisms in autistic subjects seems plausible in the light of 
studies reporting problems in information processing at the level of the STS and the 
AMG (…) and problems in connectivity between these two regions.’ [9, pp. 73-74] 
 
This mechanism may fit to the third case of malfunctioning discussed in Section 4. 
The agent-model-based computational analysis approach presented explains how a 
number of dysfunctioning connections cause certain impaired behaviors that are 
referred to as typical symptoms in the autism spectrum disorder. The agent model 
used, despite the fact that it was kept rather simple compared to the real life situation, 
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seems to give a formal confirmation that different hypotheses relating to ASD, such 
as the ones put forward in [5], [11], [16] can be explained by different types of 
malfunctioning of the mirror neuron system in a wider sense (including super 
mirroring and emotion integration). An interesting question is whether the three types 
of explanation should be considered as in competition or not. Given the broad 
spectrum of phenomena brought under the label ASD, it might well be the case that 
these hypotheses are not in competion, but describe persons with different variants of 
characteristics. The computational analysis approach presented here provides a 
framework to both unify and differentiate the different variants and their underlying 
mechanisms and to further explore them. Further research will address computational 
analysis of different hypotheses about ASD which were left out of consideration in 
the current paper, for example, the role of enhanced sensory processing sensitivity in 
ASD; e.g., [6]. Moreover, the possibilities to integrate this model in human-robot 
interaction may be addressed in further research; see, e.g., [2]. 
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